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SOME NEEDED CHANGES
IN THE TORT LAWS OF VIRGINIA*
DUDLEY WARNER WOODBEIDGEt
I.
Right of Privacy
One of our most modem torts is unprivileged violation of a
person's right of privacy. In jurisdictions without a statute on the
subject, according to Dean Prosser's analysis,1 this right encom-
passes four distinct categories of activity: (1) An intrusion into
one's physical solitude; (2) a publishing of that which violates
the ordinary decencies; (3) a placing of one in a false but not
necessarily defamatory position in the eyes of the public; and
(4) an appropriation of part of one's personality for commercial
use, i.e., advertising. In 1904, over a half-century ago, Virginia
adopted the gist of the New York statute,2 which applies to the
fourth category only This statute has made it extremely doubtful
*This paper was originally presented by Dean Woodbridge as an informal
address given at the Second Annual Seminar of the Virginia Trial Lawyers'
Association at Williamsburg on February 11, 1961. Editing and annotations
have been provided by the editorial staff.
tDr. Woodbridge is Dean and Chancellor Professor of Law at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.
1Prosser, TORTS, § 97 (2nd ed. 1955).
2N. Y. Civil Rights Law, McKinney, 1916, c. 6 §§ 5-51. The original version
of this statute was passed in 1903.
3Va. Code § 8-650 (1957 Rep1. vol.). It makes the use of a person's "name,
portrait, or picture" for advertising or purposes of trade without written
consent a misdemeanor as well as a tort. Surviving consort or kin may also
bring an action, and provision is made for exemplary as well as for com-
pensatory damages. The New York statute does not have the survival
feature, but Utah, the only other state having such a statute (Utah Code
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whether any other violations of the right of privacy are actionable
in Virginia today, for since its enactment there has been no
reported Virginia litigation on the subject.4 The expression of
one has apparently excluded the others. If it took a statute to
make a violation within the advertising category a tort,5 it would
seem that another statute would be needed to make the other
categories torts. I urge the enactment of such a statute since our
present statute is a road-block to the proper development of the
law by the courts in this new and increasingly important field.6
To take some examples that have come to my attention, should
it not be a violation of a young lady's right of privacy for a male
to gain entrance to her dormitory building at night through a door
inadvertently left ajar, sneak into her room, hide under her bed,
and then scare the living nightlights out of her? Or for a Peeping
Tom to peep,7 or for one to take too candid photographs? Recently
Ann. § 103.4-7 to 9 (1943)) has a survival feature more liberal than
Virginia's. It allows the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased
to sue where there is a publication which would have invaded the de-
ceased's right of privacy ad he been living. Nor has there been any
Virginia litigation construing the statute itsel. Contrarily, New York has
had-a plethora of cases interpreting their statute.
4Rosen, The Law of Privacy in New York, 15 N.Y.U. INTRAMURAL L.
REV. 234 (1960) analyzes these cases, pointingup the narrow construc-
tion given the term right of privacy as distin 'ed from the kindred tort
actions for trespass, assault and battery, slander, and libel.
5And it apparently did, for just prior to its enactment a case arose in the Law
and Equitv Court of the City of Richmond (Cyrus v. Boston Chemical
Co., 11 Va. L. Reg. 938 (1905) (otherwise unreported)) which held
that no cause of action would be maintained for the unauthorized use of
one's picture for advertising purposes.
6State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W. 2d 305 (1948), concerning publicity
over a rape case, upheld Wis. Stat. § 348.412, which might warrant emu-
lation provided a tort provision were added. The statute reads: "Any
person who shall publish or cause to be published in any newspaper,
magazine, periodicor circular, except as the same may be necessary in
the institution or prosecution of any civil or criminal court proceeding, or
in the compilation of the records pertinent thereto, the identity of a female
who may have been raped or subjected to any similar criminal assault, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year or by a fine not greater than five hundred dollars, or both."
7The original Peeping Tom unchivalrously peeked at Lady Godiva, whereupon,
according to legend, he was struck blind. The legend is silent as to any
tort action having been brought by either party. Such prurient prying has
since been declared a misdemeanor by statute in Virginia (Va. Code Ann.
§ 18-225.1 (1960 Repl. vol.)), but nothing is sai as to whether a tort
action will lie.
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a fire marshal who legitimately entered a private home to extin-
guish a small fire shouted, "I've seen some filthy homes in the
course of my duties, but this is absolutely the worst I've ever laid
eyes on. The people here are living in a garbage can. Is there a
photographer in the crowd? If so, I wish he would take some
pictures." The occupant was a young mother who had recently
received word that her husband was missing in action in Korea.
The rotten lettuce, sour milk, and neglected dirty dishes had no
bearing on the actual cause of the fire, but pictures were never-
theless taken and published in a newspaper. Is this not a flagrant
intrusion on the young mother's privacy?8 And what of a person
who forges a prominent citizen's name to a glowing letter of
recommendation for an office seeker whom the citizen believes
to be a scoundrel?
It seems to me inconceivable that such acts should in this
enlightened age not be torts.
II.
The Virginia Bastardy Act
And now I urge that one of the most peculiar statutes I have
ever read, the equal of the best of Ripley's Believe It or Not
cartoons, should be radically changed. Biological parents who give
birth to a child born out of wedlock are guilty of a grievous wrong
aginst their innocent offspring. This wrong arises independently
or contract and hence can be classified as a tort. The least the
father can do is to support the child until he is able to support
himself, or until someone else voluntarily takes over as in the
case of adoption. It used to be said, "It is the woman who pays"
- but some now say it is the taxpayer through Public Welfare
under the high-sounding name of aid to dependent children.9
8The would-be plaintiff in this case declined to bring suit for violation of privacy,
not because she was aware of the slim possibility of its succeeding in Vir-
ginia, but because she realized, ironically, that in pressing such a claim
she would be exacerbating the very evil for which she sought redress. This
anomalous situation may partly explain the paucity of reported cases in
this area. If our plaintiff had had statutory backing for her cause of action,
she might well have obtained a satisfactory out-of-court settlement without
undue publicity.
9Va. Code Ann., § 63-141-161 (Repl. vol. 1958).
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But why should not the father be required to pay in all those cases
where there is no reasonable doubt about his paternity? But
what does the Code of Virginia as amended in 1958 provide? I
quote, "Whenever in proceedings hereafter under this chapter
concerning a child whose parents are not married, a man admits
before any court having jurisdiction to try and dispose of the same,
that he is the father of the child or the court finds that the man
has voluntarily admitted paternity in writing, under oath, the
court may then enter and enforce judgment for the support,
maintenance and education of such child as if the child were
born in lawful wedlock."'0
So no matter how clear paternity is the father cannot be forced
to support his own offspring unless he will admit the fact of
paternity in court, or in writing under oath! Thus in the case of
Distefano v. Commonwealth," the father lived with the mother
without benefit of clergy or the equivalent, and bore him children.
He claimed these children as exemptions in filing his income tax
returns. The Supreme Court of Appeals very properly held that
under the above statute the father could not be made to support
the children because one does not voluntarily (one is drafted)
file an income tax return nor does one make oath that it is true
in all respects, even if the penalties of perjury are automatically
imposed by statute for intentional misrepresentations.
What would plaintiffs' attorneys think of a similar statute
with reference to negligence, to wit: 'Whenever in proceedings
in negligence cases before courts having jurisdiction therein, the
defendant admits that he was negligent, or where the court finds
the defendant has voluntarily admitted in writing under oath that
he was negligent, then and then only, will an action lie for
damages caused by such alleged negligence?"
What possible reason can there be for this fools' bastardy act? 2
The only explanation I have ever heard, is that it is the settled
policy of this Commonwealth never to compel the white father
of a mullato child to support same, and, naturally since the statute
cannot make such an exception in so many words, an easy out
1OVa. Code Ann., § 20-61.1 (RepI. vol. 1960).
11201 Va. 23, 109 S.E. 2d 497 (1959).
12No law can in logic or justice exist without a substantiating reason.
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has to be given to all fathers of illegitimate children; but why
concern for actual race mixing miscegenationists should be al-
lowed to make a travesty of our bastardy laws is entirely beyond
my rational comprehension.
II.
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
Whether the attractive nuisance doctrine is law in Virginia
at the present time, and if so, to what extent, should definitely
be cleared up.'3 The overwhelming majority of states now recog-
nize the doctrine subject to some reasonable limitations.' 4 Both
the doctrine and its limitations are admirably set forth in Section
339 of the A.L.I. Restatement of Torts. This section is short and
to the point as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm
to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains on the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one
upon which the possessor knows or should know that such
children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize as in-
volving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm
to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling
in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
13The most recent definitive statement by the Supreme Court of Appeals on
the matter appears in Washabaugh v. Northern Virginia Const. Co., 187
Va. 767, 48 S.E. 2d 276 (1948), where the court expressly denies the
existence of the doctrine in Virginia. But compare the cases which permit
vong children to recover when a "dangerous instrumentality" is involved:
Daucherty v Hippchen, 175 Va. 62, 7 S.E. 2d 119 (1940); Haywood v.
Souli Hill Mfg. Co., 142 Va. 761, 128 S.E. 362 (1925). See also, Beatty,
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in The Virginias, 10 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 20 (1953).
14Dean Prosser indicates the last decisions of eight states still reject the doctrine,
but the number is steadily decreasing. Prosser, TORTS 439 (2d ed.
1955).
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(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condi-
tion is slight as compared to the risk to young children in-
volved therein.
If our legislature would codify these provisions, then our
courts, having gotten off on the wrong foot originally, would no
longer feel limited by the old cases and would be free to take a
more humanitarian view in the future.
IV.
Comparative Negligence Statutes
For all practical purposes we have only one state comparative
negligence statute - the public railway grade crossing statute15
where failure of the railroad's employees to give the signals
required by law prevents plaintiff's action from being barred by
the fact that he or his testate or intestate was contributorily negli-
gent, said contributory negligence, however, going in mitigation
of damages. This statute has been held to have no application
within incorporated cities or towns not having ordinances requir-
ing signals.16 In such cases the general principles of the common
law are applicable and an injured person is barred by his con-
tributory negligence.
It seems to me perfectly absurd to have one rule for a person
who is injured in a railroad crossing accident in the country and
another for one injured in such an accident in a city or town; or
for that matter to have one rule when the railroad's liability is
based on an ordinance and another rule when it is based on
common law. The natural justice of all these cases is the same.
If the legislature would amend the Code § 56-416 to read,
"If the employees in charge of any railroad engine or train fail to
give the signals required by statute, ordinance, or common law,
etc.," this defect could easily be remedied.
But the law of comparative negligence should be extended to
protect pedestrians and bicyclists. Suppose that P, a pedestrian,
15Va. Code Ann. § 56-416 (Rep1. vol. 1959).
16Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Emmett Graham Hagy, 201 Va.
183, 110 S.E. 2d 177 (1959).
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is injured by M, a motorist. Suppose further that each was to
blame for the injury and that P has suffered $20,000 damages
but M's car does not even have a dent in the bumper. Why
should the entire $20,000 loss fall on one guilty party and none
on the other? We allow contribution between joint wrongdoers
in other cases of negligence. 17 Why not in this one, too? Surely
a contest between a pedestrian and an automobile or a bicycle
and an automobile is just as uneven as one between an auto-
mobile and a railroad locomotive.
V.
Death by Wrongful Act Statutes
In my opinion our Death by Wrongful Act statutes18 need
to be overhauled.
First, as to the amount of the recovery. Why have any dif-
ferent rule as to the measure of damages in death cases than in
any other cases? The maximum recovery of $30,000,'9 as a matter
of fact, can be grossly inadequate or grossly excessive depending
on the circumstances of each case. The $30,000 limitation is
almost an invitation to the jury to award that amount, and when
the jury feels sympathetic toward the victim of a tragedy and his
next of kin and know that the rich insurance companies, or
corporations, won't miss the $30,000 and when the amount
awarded is practically within the sole discretion of the jury,"0 no
wonder there are excessive verdicts. On the other hand, if a
man with an earned income of say $15,000 a year with a wife
and family to support is negligently killed, the $30,000 (even if
net) (and you know it is not net), is only a few years' support -
a grossly inadequate sum.
17Va. Code Ann. § 8-627 (Rep1. vol. 1957).
lBVa. Code Ann. § 8-633 et seq. (Rep1. vol. 1957).
19Va. Code Ann. § 8-636 (Rep1. vol. 1957).
20A jury verdict assessin damages for wrongful death has been held to be final,
and the Supreme Court has no authority to disturb it. Highway E_,press
Lines v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 40 S.E. 2d 294 (1946), Chick Transit
Corp. v. Edenton, 170 Va. 361, 196 S.E. 648 (1938), Harris v. Razer,
165 Va. 461, 182 S.E. 276 (1935), Ratcliffe v. McDonald, 123 Va.
781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918).
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Second, as to the beneficiaries: Instead of dividing them into
what is in effect three classes, they should be divided into two
classes, and not on arbitrary lines of relationship, but according
to dependency, or no dependency. In the case of actual and
legal dependency the dependents should take free from the
claims of creditors, as at present," but where there is no legal
or actual dependency, the recovery should belong to the estate
and be subject to the claims of creditors.22
To illustrate, if X is killed outright as the result of Y's negli-
gence, and X owes his landlady for room and board, G for gaso-
line, D for doctor's bills, not growing out of the accident, etc.,
and X's estate's only asset is the cause of action for his wrongful
death, and X's only relative is B, a brother in California who is
contemptuous of his less fortunate Virginia brother, why should
the California brother who has not been injured a nickel be
allowed say $20,000 while X's creditors who have befriended
him in his hours of need, get nothing?2 And as near as I can
tell from the statutes, X would be buried at public expense if his
brother who has received the $20,000 did not see fit to pay his
21Va. Code § 8-638 allows only for ". . . payment of costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees .. ." by the personal representative in cases in which there are
representatives of a class, and the rest ... shall be free from all debts and
liabilities of the deceased; ...
This therefore implies, and it has been so held, that hospital, medical
and funeral expenses are not recoverable and are not proper elements of dam-
ages. Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E. 2d 561 (1954). The
court states, 'We have frequently held that an action for wrongful death
is not for the benefit of the decedent's estate, but for certain near relatives."
Patterson v. Anderson, 194 Va. 557, 74 S.E. 2d (1953); Porter v. Va.
Elec. & Power Co., 183 Va. 108, 31 S.E. 2d 337 (1944).
22This is the view today but only to prevent abatement of the action due to lack
of class beneficiaries. This gives our death by wrongful act statute, in very
limited cases, the attributes of a survival statute.
23The court has admitted this result in Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78
S.E. 2d 654 (1953): "Instruction erroneously emphasized the idea that
the purpose and object of the statute is to allow damages solely to those
who might reasonably look to decedent for support. That is a matter to
be considered by the jury, but it is not the sole-basis of recovery on which
the statutory beneficiaries may rely or the only element of damage to be
considered by the jury. There are other matters and elements such as the
loss of decedent's care, attention and society, and the sorrow, suffering and
mental anguish occasioned the beneficiaries by reason of his death, which
may be considered and taken into account by the jury and are elements for
which damages may be given to the statutory beneficiaries even though
they may have had no reasonable expectancy of support from the decedent
hadhe not been killed." 195 Va. at pp. 487488.
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funeral expenses. In passing, I note that lawyers, doctors, hos-
pitals and nurses have a limited lien for expenses connected with
the negligent death and the recovery of damages therefor, but no
one seems to love or remember the undertaker.24
Then, there is at least one uncertainty that should be cleared
up. Suppose there is only one beneficiary in the present class 1,
and that he is a joint tortfeasor in causing the death of deceased
who is survived by a brother who is in c ass 2. The statute pro-
vides that no one in class 2 shall take as long as there is any one
in class 1. Does this mean, then, that since the class 1 beneficiary
is barred by his negligence, no one takes, or does the statute
mean that as long as there is no one in class 1 capable of taking,
then no one in class 2 can take?25
In the case of descent and distribution, in the case of dower,26
and in cases of Workmen's Compensation,27 a spouse who has
deserted loses his or her rights to take, but not so in the case of
death by wrongful act. But why not? Probably just an oversight
but an oversight that should be remedied. In Matthews v.
24A list of miscellaneous liens arising from a tort resulting in a wrongful death
action could include: Hospital, medical and nursing services, Va. Code
§ § 32-138 to 32-146; ambulances, Va. Code § 43-63.1; Hotels and boarding
houses, Va. Code §§ 43-31 to 43-40.
The Workmen's Compensation Act throws a rather meatless bone to
the undertaker by allowing a recovery for burial expenses if the deceased
employee leaves no dependents. Va. Code § 65-67.
25Virginia has held that where the sole beneficiary under the Death by Wrong-
ful Act statute was himself guilty of contributory negligence, the action
is barred in toto. Ratcliffe v. McDonald, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307
(1918).
In Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S.E. 733 (1931), the Virginia
court accepted the opinion of the American Law Institute, Restatement of
Torts, vol. 2, Comment A to § 493, and held that where mother and
father were the beneficiaries, and a verdict was granted separately for each,
the part of the verdict alloted to the contributorily negligent father should
be set aside, and the remainder left intact to the mother. The question
presented here in the text was not answered as both mother and father
were in the same class. There seems to be no law dealing with this specific
point. But see, generally, Anno. 2 A.L.R. 2d 785 (1948). Contributory
negligence of beneficiaries as affecting action under death or survival
statute.
26As to desertion, Va. Code § 64-35 and § 64-24. As to adultery, Va. Code
§ 64-19.
27Va. Code § 65-63(1) (Rep1. vol. 1958).
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Hicks,28 the surviving consort had not only deserted but was
living in adultery. Yet, since she was the only one in class 1, she
took. The damages, of course, were very little,2 but why should
a wrongdoer be in a better position because the deceased's wife
is a deserting adulteress? The sensible solution to the problem
would be to deprive such a person of any right to recover, and go
on to the next eligible person. One who is not good enough to
inherit, or to take dower or curtesy, or workmen's compensation is
surely not worthy of taking under a death by wrongful act
statute.
VI.
Liability of Charities
Let us suppose that X needs medical attention unexpectedly.
There is no room for him at hospital A, but finally a bed is
found in hospital C. Unknown to X, hospital C qualifies as a
charity although it attempts to collect from all who can pay.30
X can pay and expects to pay. He is injured or killed as the
result of the negligent act of an employee, but the employee's
supervisor had no reason to suppose that the employee would act
negligently.31 It appears to be the law in Virginia that X has no
recourse against the hospital.32 But there is no reason why a
28197 Va. 112, 87 S.E. 2d 629 (1955), also see Porter v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 183 Va. 108, 31 S.E. 2d 337 (1944), where the surviving
spouse lived apart from deceased for about fifteen years prior to his death.
Also, Mitchell v. Kennedy, 166 Va. 346, 186 S.E. 40 (1936).
29Although she was not barred, evidence of her misconduct was admissible to
help jury to ascertain damages recoverable.
30"A hospital which is chartered to the care for sick and disabled persons and
which has no capital stock and is not conducted for dividends or profits is
a charity hospital and the fact that it receives compensation from patients
who are able to pay for the accommodations received does not render it
any less a charitable institution in the eyes of the law." Hospital of St.
Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
31"... the only duty which a charitable hospital owed to its patients was the
exercise of due care in the selection and retention of its servants." Weston
v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
32Cases holding a public hospital not liable for its torts to patients: Fry v.
Albemarle County, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1890); Maia v. Eastern
State Hospital, 97 Va. 507, 34 S.E. 617 (1899); Weston v. Hospital
of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
Same as to private, but charitable hospitals: Stuart Circle Hospital v.
Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E. 2d 153 (1939); Danville Community Hos-
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charity cannot carry liability insurance. To punish X by denying
him damages so that the C Hospital may help others is in effect
forcing X to be charitable to persons he does not even know. Why
should not the C Hospital be just to X before being generous to
others? I believe that our legislature should pass a statute put-
ting charities on the same basis as any other legal person, as they
now are in many jurisdictions.P
VII.
State Torts Claims Act
And finally I suggest that the State of Virginia pass a State
Torts Claims Act very much like that of the Federal Torts Claims
Act.34 Private corporations once attempted to get out of tort
pital v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E. 2d 882 (1947); Jefferson Hos-
pital, Inc. v. Van Lear, 186 Va. 74, 41 S.E. 2d 441 (1947).
33Some jurisdictions permitting recovery against charitable institutions: Arizona
- Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d220 (1951); Cali-
fornia - Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.
2d 798 (1939); Delaware - Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350,
83 A. 2d 753 (1947); District of Columbia -President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 123, 130 F. 2d 810
(1942); Kansas-Noel v. Minninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.
2d 934 (1954); Michigan-Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1,
105 N.W. 2d 1 (1960); Mississippi-Mississippi Baptist Hospital v.
Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); New York- Bing v. St.
John's Episcopal Hospital, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957); North
Dakota - Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.
2d 247 (1946); Ohio - Klema Adm'r. v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital of
Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E. 2d 765 (1960); Vermont-
Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d
230 (1950); Washington- Pierce v. Yalima Valley Memorial Hospital
Association, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953). In the Pierce
case the court said in abandoning the doctrine of tort immunity as a lied
to charitable institutions: "Ordinarily, when a court decides to mod or
abandon a court-made rule of long standing, it starts out by saying that
'the reason for the rule no longer exists. In this case, it is correct to say
that the 'reasons' originally given for the rule of immunity never did
exist.... ."Wisconsin - Kojis v. Doctors Hospital . ............. Wis .......... 107
N.W. 2d 131 (1961). Many writers and commentators agree that the
rule of respondeat superior should render a charitable institution liable for
its torts and those of its employees. See: 2A BOGERT ON TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1953), #401, pp. 241-254; Prosser, TORTS (2nd
ed. 1955), # 109, p. 786 et seq.; 2 Harper and James, TORTS (1956),
p. 1397, note 9. Freezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 191.
34Federal Tort Claim Act, U. S. Code, Title 28, §§ 2671 et seq. The substan-
tive provisions of the statutes state in part: "The United States shall be
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liability on the ground that they were not authorized by their
charters to commit torts, and hence only their employees could
be liable. The obvious answer was, of course, that while they
were no more privileged than anyone else to commit torts, they
had the power to commit them, and when they wrongfully
exercised that power through their servants or agents, they were
liable.
I submit that the same reasoning is equally applicable to
public corporations. The maxim that the King can do no wrong
has no place in modern American law. The right to recover for
torts committed by State employees within what would be the
scope of their authority if they were employed by private cor-
porations, should not depend upon the injured person's ability to
get reimbursement by a private act of the legislature, but on the
justice of his case under the general law of torts as determined by
the State's own courts. Surely the State should not ask for
favored treatment as against one who has been injured by its
negligence. Justice becometh a Sovereign as well as her subjects.
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort clains, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for
punitive damages..."
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